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REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE.
Boston, January 31, 1936.
To the Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives
in General Court Assembled.
In accordance with section 18 of chapter 486 of the
Acts of 1909, the Finance Commission of the City of
Boston submits its annual report for the year 1935.
1. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMISSION.
On March 21, 1935, Philip A. Chapman of No. 47
Sudan street, Dorchester, was appointed by Governor
James M. Curley to fill out the unexpired term of
Joseph McKenney.
On August 29, William W. Saxe replaced Judge
Jacob J. Kaplan whose term expired on August 18.
On November 13, Robert Robinson of No. 19 South
street, Brighton, replaced William W. Saxe who resigned.
On January 7, 1936, James E. Maguire of No. 41
St. Andrew road. East Boston, was appointed to fill out
the unexpired term of William Arthur Reilly who
resigned on the same date.
On January 15, 1936, Joseph A. Scolponeti of No. 31
May street, Jamaica Plain, was appointed to fill out the
unexpired term of Alexander Wheeler who resigned on
January 13.
The full bench of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts upheld the right of Governor Curley to
designate E. Mark Sullivan as Chairman, question of
such right having been raised by Judge Kaplan.
4II. APPROPRIATION AND EXPENDITURES.
The amount appropriated for the Finance Commission
for the year 1935 was $50,000. The expenditures were
as follows:
Permanent employees $34,100 00
Printing and binding 575 16
Transportation of persons 168 43
Light and power 160 14
Rent 5,100 00
Telegrams, telephones and messenger service 504 35
Cleaning 72 00
Fees 7 50
Photographing and blueprinting .... 1 85
Miscellaneous items and repairs .... 30 30
Office equipment 1 75
Library equipment 188 08
Office supplies 342 89
Ice 45 40
Miscellaneous supplies 1 1 25
Electrical supplies 6 48
Hire of experts, etc., in special investigations 7,775 54
$49,091 12
Amount appropriated $50,000 00
Amount expended 49,091 12
Balance unexpended $908 88
III. THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION.
A perusal of the record of the activities of the Com-
mission in the twenty-five years of its existence cannot
fail to impress any who take the trouble to inspect it
that the year 1935 was one of the most important in
the life of the Commission. The reports made during
the year were many and varied. For the most part,
they dealt with appropriations about to be made on
the Mayor's recommendation; with contracts about to
be awarded with the Mayor's approval; with appoint-
ments about to be made at the Mayor's direction; and
0with wanted changes by the Mayor in policies that had
been proven sound in many years of experience. The
majority of the reports might be characterized as pre-
ventive reports, that is, reports offered in advance of a
contemplated expenditure of public funds which, in the
opinion of the Finance Commission, would be unwise.
In all such reports the Commission opposed the
expressed desires of what is known as the Mansfield
administration, because the Commission believed that
the best interests of the taxpayers were not being served.
It is easy, therefore, to understand that these reports
provoked a hostility from the Mayor and from those
associated with him in carrying out certain purposes of
his administration that was never previously matched
in the history of the Finance Commission.
The good faith of the members of the Commission
was frequently attacked. The motives of the Commis-
sion w^ere characterized as a plot to prevent the Mayor
from undertaking an investigation that was originally
recommended to him by two of the members of the
Commission. Yet the two who had first suggested his
investigation had joined heartily in the work which the
Mayor decried. A faithful staff of employees w^ho, by
many years of fair dealing with City employees, had
earned respect and consideration in City Hall depart-
ments and had served all Commissions alike did not
escape the tirade of abuse that flowed continually from
the administration's mouthpieces. But through it all
the Commission continued to function as the Legisla-
ture which created it intended that it should. It was
not deterred by attacks from many quarters that were
inspired by groups or agencies that had an ulterior
motive in trying to build up for the Mansfield adminis-
tration a prestige that it does not deserve.
The record shows that the Commission's reports
during the year were unanimously adopted by all
members of the Commission with but a single exception.
This single exception amounted to no more than that
three members said a particular matter had been
6investigated until there was nothing more that the
Commission could do, and the minority membership
said it should be investigated further, but by somebody
else. Yet, to the very end of the year the minority
membership joined heartily with the majority in every
other work undertaken and every other report made.
There never was greater unanimity than this in any
day of the Commission since its creation in 1909.
The Finance Commission, as it existed in 1934, with-
held public criticism of the mistakes of the Mansfield
administration during that year. It has been the
policy of the Commission to permit a new mayor to
become accustomed to the intricate problems of munic-
ipal administration before enlisting public opinion to
prevent continuation of mistakes. The records of the
Commission for the year 1934 reveal many instances of
a desire, expressed in informal reports to the Mayor,
to help him to function efficiently and economically.
Added justification for this leniency was that the times
were very trying, and the depression was then at its
lowest level. There was consequent demand upon all
public agencies on the one hand to help out the large
number of people in want, and on the other hand to
reduce taxation. It is true, nevertheless, that the
Mayor had increased his difficulty by replacing with
new appointees who were inexperienced in public office
many old, reliable employees who had been found so
valuable by previous administrations that the con-
tinuance of their employment was never before in
question.
When, however, the financial burdens — temporarily
lightened by wholesale layoffs of City employees, by a
general reduction in salaries, and by suppression or cur-
tailment of municipal service previously enjoyed —
were subsequently increased by violations of the ele-
mentary principles and practices of fair bidding and
contract awards; by the increasing frequency of hand-
ing out work to favorite political contractors with
little or no check-up of the prices charged; by an
7utter neglect to carry out systems of management of
municipal activity installed after much study and great
expense, then it became apparent that the Mayor in
office had been too kindly dealt with. Administration
mistakes had become abuses; the informal reports,
offered in a spirit of cooperation, were being pigeon-
holed without corrective action; specious explanations
were being given of administrative acts which were
inexplainable unless charged off either to incompetence
or to a desire to repay political debts with public funds.
It is noteworthy that though attempt has been made
to belittle the work of the Commission by alleging to it
false motives, the facts and figures portraying ineffi-
ciency, incompetency, and often more serious revela-
tions have been steadily piling up against the present
administration in City affairs. The reports containing
these facts and figures are conclusive evidence that the
Commission in the past year has performed the duty
that the Legislature gave it to do.
Some of the principal activities of the Commission
during the year were as follows:
1. The Investigation of the So-Called Dolan
Case and the Land-Takings for the East
Boston Vehicular Tunnel.
When the year began the principal item on the Com-
mission's docket was the special investigation which was
started by the Finance Commission in the fall of 1934
in an effort to substantiate sensational charges made in
the gubernatorial campaign of that period relating to
certain administrative matters in the City of Boston.
The attorney who was hired in 1934 to conduct it w^as still
at work and under pay from the Finance Commission.
He had the assistance of the entire staff of the Com-
mission. Some of his reports had been made public;
other reports relating to charges made in the campaign
had been offered by him to the Commission as it was
constituted at the end of 1934 (Messrs. Leonard, Storey,
8Donahue, Wheeler and Sheehan, with Judge Kaplan
later replacing Leonard), but had been rejected. The
record reveals that these reports were rejected by the
Commission of 1934 because they lacked the facts to
warrant the conclusions contained in them. The new
membership of the Commission that came into office in
January of 1935 gave the special investigator every
opportunity to pursue his inquiry to its conclusion. All
the facilities of the Commission remained at his dis-
posal. Extra help was hired, as he asked for it, and, in
fact, every request he made for funds or assistance for
investigation purposes was granted.
After another month of futile effort by him to supple-
ment the information already in possession of the
Commission when he was originally hired, he suddenly
resigned his job, taking with him copies of all the
testimony acquired in the investigation. This was
without suggestion from the Commission and without
any previous warning by him of dissatisfaction with the
cooperation the new Commission was giving to him.
He offered no new reports at this time, but re-submitted
reports previously rejected by the old Commission.
Later the new Commission made a report relating to
the purchase of securities by Edmund L. Dolan as City
Treasurer in the years 1930 to 1933. This report was
signed by all the members, three of whom were new
appointees, and the remaining two (Judge Kaplan and
Alexander Wheeler) were appointees of former Governor
Ely. The material for this report had been assembled
by Alexander Wheeler with the advice of the expert
bond broker who was hired by the old Commission.
It included everything of value found in the special
investigator's report. The Commission's conclusion in
this report was that a profit of approximately 2 per cent
had been made by brokers on bonds sold to the City.
It contained no criticism of the acts of the aforemen-
tioned City Treasurer.
It was the unanimous conclusion of the Commission
at the time that this investigation was then completed.
9Some weeks later, however, because of a repetition of
public statements containing no more alleged facts
than had been offered to the old Finance Commission
and decided by them to have been unsubstantiated, the
special investigator enlisted to his support certain well-
known public men. It was his claim that the new
Commission had suppressed his reports.
As a result, the Legislative Committee on Rules held
hearings for the purpose of determining w^hether or not
there was any merit to the charges being made. At
this hearing the Finance Commission promptly turned
over to the Legislative Committee all the reports that
the special investigator had made and it was a shock to
the Committee to discover that the special investigator
had been misleading the public: that his so-called sup-
pressed reports contained nothing not already made
public by the Finance Commission except his own
opinions. These were the opinions which the old
Commission rejected because unsubstantiated.
At the request of the Committee on Rules, the
Finance Commission reopened its own investigation
and heard more witnesses. Later the Commission made
another report and gave to the Committee on Rules
complete copies of the testimony taken during the
inquiry. This testimony was given to the Press and
was printed in full in several newspapers.
Three members of the Finance Commission then
concluded, and so reported, that the Finance Commis-
sion had given to the Committee on Rules all the facts
that could be obtained by the Finance Commission in
relation to charges concerning the purchase of securities
by the City Treasurer of Boston in 1930-1933, and
in relation to the land-takings and other matters inves-
tigated. Judge Kaplan and Alexander Wheeler made
a minority report which, in effect, expressed dissatis-
faction with the testimony of the witnesses examined
by the Commission under oath, and recommended
further investigation by a committee of the Legislature
or by the Corporation Counsel of Boston.
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In a personal statement to the Committee on Rules
which had previously been published, Mr. Wheeler
expressed the opinion that it would be a waste of time
and money further to continue the investigation.
It was obvious to all the members of the Finance
Commission that whatever were the motives of the
members who started this investigation, it had become
steeped with political considerations. It was not an
attempt to accomplish some good for the taxpayers of
Boston, but a political job that was being kept going for
an ulterior purpose. The Commission unanimously
decided that since the Legislative Committee on Rules
had taken the investigation out of the hands of the
Finance Commission, the Finance Commission should
turn its attention to the regular investigative work of
the Commission which had been long neglected.
2. Boston City Hospital.
The Finance Commission has long kept a watchful
eye on the continued development of conditions at the
Boston City Hospital that were gradually destroying
efficient management of this important institution.
While the City was spending millions of dollars in
replacing a worn out and outmoded physical plant, the
result of a commendatory step begun in 1930, capable
management was becoming a lost art and an institution
that had acquired high national standing for the quality
of its service was steadily approaching the lowest level
in management in its history. This was not due either
to lack of ability or the character of the Superintendent
at the time, but wholly to interference with his manage-
ment from within and without the institution.
The Commission had already attempted to stem the
tide of disintegration by frequent conference with
hospital officials, and by reports of conditions to the
Mayor and Council. When it became apparent in
1935 that other means would not avail, the Commission
gave to the public a report on some of the details of
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management that shocked the community. This re-
vealed that the pay roll was overloaded, principally by
political appointees; that selection of employees had
been taken from the hands of the trustees and Super-
intendent; that persons previously unknown to the
hospital authorities were being sent in to them by the
employees of the Mayor's office and certain members
of the City Council to be put on the pay roll and the
Superintendent required to find some excuse to warrant
paying them a salary; that there was no central or
definite authority for administration within the hospital
organization; that wholesale thievery of food, medi-
cines, supplies and equipment existed without check;
that there was absolutely no control on the entrances
and exits, thirteen of them, and that as a result unidenti-
fiable persons could enter and roam at will throughout
the institution, and take out whatever they liked. The
hospital was using more food proportionately and paying
a higher price for it than any other of several similar
institutions visited by representatives of the Commis-
sion, yet the patients complained of its quality when
served.
These and many other equally indefensible conditions
related in the report led the Commission to demand a
reorganization of the executive staff and the substitution
of a good business management. Some improvements
have resulted, notably a closer supervision of the
comings and goings of employees, a control on the
admission of visitors, and a closer matching of the foods
and other supplies purchased with the amount properly
used at the institution. Generally, the management
has been improved, because authority has been cen-
tralized in the Superintendent. The many conscien-
tious physicians and surgeons who give their time
without compensation to the work of the institution are
better satisfied with the conditions. An anomalous
situation, however, still remains: The statutes place
the responsibility of management on an unpaid board
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of trustees, but the Mayor has placed it on a subor-
dinate, the Superintendent. The Finance Commis-
sion's recommendation was for a change in the statutes
to accomphsh this needed improvement legally.
3. The East Boston Vehicular Tunnel.
The construction of the East Boston Vehicular Tunnel
was one of the most needed contributions to the public
service of Metropolitan Boston in a generation. It
not only provided easy access from the City Proper
to what should become one of its most important com-
mercial subdivisions, but it permitted a speed and safety
in transportation between important business and
residential centers to the north and the south of the
City that, as time goes on, becomes increasingly
valuable.
It is much more than a local improvement. It
serves the whole shore front of Massachusetts. Boston,
however, must pay for it out of the funds of Boston
taxpayers until the collection of tolls from the people
who use it becomes great enough to relieve the tax-
payers of that burden. The City borrowed approxi-
mately $20,000,000 to pay for it. The cost of main-
tenance and the carrying charges on the debt incurred
amount to close to SI,500,000 per year.
It was, therefore, all important that it should be
operated efficiently from the start and that every
effort should be made to increase its earnings and to
husband them carefully so that the portion the tax-
payers are called upon to pay towards financing it
might be kept at the lowest possible figure.
Yet the Finance Commission found after the tunnel
had been in public use for a year that a mechanical
system installed at a cost of over $100,000 and intended
to provide a check upon the proper receipt of the money
collected and collectible was being allowed to decay
without any serious attempt to make use of it. Though
the system was entirely mechanical and, like all mechani-
cal things, in need of regular attention, such elementary
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needs as, for instance, periodic oiling had been neglected.
The Commission was informed by City employees that
for six months after the tunnel was opened to the public
no one was assigned to take charge of the working of
the mechanical system. Some officials of the Public
Works Department who were in custody of it informed
the Commission that the system was impractical and
useless. Employees of the Transit Department which
bought it and installed it, on the other hand, candidly
stated to the Commission that the Public Works Depart-
ment employees did not want it to work.
Finance Commission investigators found that the
turn-in of tolls collected by the collectors never agreed
with the totals the machines registered; and almost
never equalled the amount the machines registered.
Though definite schedules were adopted which deter-
mined the amount which should be collected for each
type of vehicle, in several periods of observation the
Finance Commission investigators found that collectors
disregarded the schedule of rates to the detriment of
the City. They also observed on many occasions the
failure of collectors to register any collection.
Numbers of persons informed the Finance Com-
mission that they saw no fees being recorded though
they had seen them collected. The employees claimed
the machines were inaccurate. The makers of the
machine said they worked all right in other places and
there was no reason why they should not work all right
in Boston. It was apparent that the City was being
defrauded.
The publicity given to the situation by the Finance
Commission finally impressed on the Public Works
officials the necessity for putting the machinery of
collection in order and of keeping it in order. Like all
systems, however, successful and honest operation
depends on the character of those employed to carry
it out. It is the duty of the Public Works Department
officials who have this enterprise in charge to be alert to
any possibility of defect from any cause.
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4. Award of City Contracts.
Since the charter of the City was amended in 1909 to
give the Mayor complete and absolute control of the
award of contracts by department heads, the City has
gradually built up a reputation, not previously enjoyed,
of dealing fairly, in the award of contracts, with business
firms desiring to do business with the City. Contracts
amounting to more than $1,000 had to be advertised
publicly except in cases where department heads, to
avoid the necessity of advertising, would offer a reason
that might be considered sufficient to stand the test of
public inspection.
When bids had been publicly solicited, it usually
meant that, unless there was some special reason for
doing otherwise, the award would go to the lowest
bidder. In the years since the charter amendments
brought about this change, the number of responsible
business firms competing on an equal footing for City
contracts has been ever increasing.
Occasionally a deviation from such a policy has pro-
voked a protest from the Finance Commission, but
considering the number of contracts advertised and the
number that have been awarded to other than the
lowest bidder, it might properly be said that the infrac-
tions of the rule before 1934 only proved the rule.
Last year, however, there appeared to be a concerted
effort on the part of several department heads to break
down this long established policy with respect to awards.
The Commission reported instances to the Mayor. It
was surprising to the Commission that instead of the
customary, courteous acknowledgment from the Mayor
of the receipt of reports, the reply usually came in the
form of a statement given to the newspapers attacking
the motives of the Commission in making the report.
The facts of the reports were seldom answered cate-
gorically, and denial was never sustained.
In these reports the Commission pointed out many
ways by which department heads sought to violate the
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principle of dealing fairly with firms seeking to transact
business with the City. Some of these were as follows
:
Informal bids" were being asked for in a greater
number of instances than ever before. " Informal
"
bidding means asking a selected few to submit
prices privately. There is no public competition,
and therefore there is opportunity for manipulation
of figures.
Firms which were the lowest bidders in com-
petition and had complied with the requirements
of the bidding by filing certified checks as guarantees
of good faith were determined to be ^^not financially
responsible" and therefore their bids rejected.
Firms which were the lowest bidders in compe-
tition were denied awards because the department
heads wanted ''to give the business to a local con-
cern. " On the other hand, often local firms, without
political affiliations, were denied favorable considera-
tion, when low bidder, for captious reasons.
Some firms, the lowest bidders in competition,
and who had complied with the requirements, were
determined to be ^^not qualified by experience."
One firm thus denied a contract had been in the
same line of business for fifty years.
In some cases one of a number of firms in competi-
tion was allowed to write the specifications. When
the bids were asked for, it was found that the firm
which wrote the specifications had placed its com-
petitors at the disadvantage of having to quote
prices on equipment which only the firm which wrote
the specifications could sell.
Purchases were often made and contracts often
awarded without definite written specifications.
In these cases the awards were always to firms which
had estabhshed political contacts.-
In awarding snow-removal contracts, the Public
Works Commissioner ignored failure to comply
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with specifications and awarded a contract to one
contractor, not the lowest bidder, because ^^he
wanted him to have the contract."
The Finance Commission investigated all these and
many similar cases. In practically every one there was
discrimination against responsible business firms. In
most of them, complaint was made to the Commission
by firms suffering from this discrimination. The Com-
mission was prompted to make protest in these cases
for two reasons: (1) the City could not afford to pay the
extra cost for service or merchandise made necessary by
this favoritism; (2) continuation of such policies was
likely to result in the decision by reliable business firms
to ignore the business of the City of Boston. The City
then would be dependent on firms of low standing or of
no standing.
As the result of these reports, there was some slight
let-up in the objectionable practices, but that the evil
has not yet been eradicated is evidenced by recent awards,
as in the case of the purchase of snow-removal equipment
by the Superintendent of Supphes and in the case of an
award of a contract for trucking by the Library Depart-
ment.
5. Appointment of an Excessive Number
OF Constables.
When public announcement w^as made that IVIayor
Mansfield proposed to appoint twenty-eight additional
constables to the pay roll and to scatter them throughout
the departments of the City, the Finance Commission
was prompted to ask the reason for it. It meant adding
approximately $50,000 to the taxpayers' burden. The
Mayor never replied to the Commission's letter.
The appointment of a constable is made by the
Mayor with the approval of the City Council. It does
not require civil service approval, and selection of
appointees is not made from any list examined or certi-
fied by the Civil Service Commission.
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For several years past it has been recognized that the
only way by which an administration could reward
political supporters with public employment, without
compliance with the testing and selection that the
Civil Service laws require, was by putting them at work
and calhng them constables. Mayor Mansfield had
already placed a new batch of fifty appointees on the
City pay rolls.
The Finance Commission examined the heads of de-
partments who employed persons rated as constables.'^
From their testimony, it appeared that of the fifty em-
ployed, not more than two or three were actually per-
forming duties which required the service of " Si con-
stable,'' as the statutes set forth those services. For
the most part, they were acting as clerks, messengers,
inspectors or investigators. If given their correct rat-
ings, they would have come within the purview of the
Civil Service Commission. Their continued employ-
ment, therefore, under the rating of ''constable" was an
evasion of the Civil Service laws.
In addition, it appeared from the testimony of the
department heads examined that the duties assigned to
many of them were either fictitious, or could be absorbed
by other employees without hardship to any.
No department head examined, however, would
admit that he had asked for any more or that he could
use any more. Some went so far as to say that they
could get along with less. Yet the Mayor was asking
the City Council to approve the appointment of twenty-
eight more whom he must have the departments absorb.
It was unjustifiable loading of the pay roll to the amount
of $50,000. It was a plain case of paying political
debts by passing out appointments to the City pay roll.
The Finance Commission naturally objected. The
Commission asked the Civil Service Commission to
take action to uphold the principles of the Civil Service
laws. The Commission asked the Mayor to abandon
this unwarranted loading of the City pay roll.
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After the Council confirmed the appointments, the
Mayor held in abeyance for several weeks the assign-
ment of the new constables. When, however, the
Legislature had completed its determination of the
amount of money the City could spend during the
year, the twenty-eight constables were established on
the pay roll.
The Finance Commission believes that the services
of these twenty-eight men are unnecessary, and their
appointment was accomplished by subterfuge.
6. Renovation of Quincy Market Building.
A criticism of policy which the Commission found it
necessary to make many times during the past year
related to the inclination o^ the administration aides to
commit the City to eventual heavy expenditure of
funds without careful and scientific analysis of the
problem before them at the time. The purchase of
snow-removal equipment later discussed; the award of
split contracts by the Public Works Department; the
purchase of the most expensive type of kitchen equip-
ment at Long Island, when a cheaper and more efficient
type would have served the institution better, are
instances of the bad judgment exercised, which the
Finance Commission pointed out.
The most aggravated instance of this nature was in
the case of the request by the jNIayor for the authori-
zation by the City Council of an appropriation of
almost $500,000 to carry out plans for remodelling the
Quincy Market Building. These plans teemed with
extravagance and lavish outlay. They would have
required the razing of a roof that was, for the most part,
sound and serviceable. The consequent waste would be
approximately $100,000. They required the replace-
ment of girders then being installed at a cost of approxi-
mately $45,000, all of which would have been wasted.
They required the lining of cellar walls with a type of
tile that ordinarily is used where a high degree of
ornamentation is desirable. They required the installa-
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tion of terrazzo floors, the most expensive type, in the
basement and in the meat stalls on the first floor. The
major portion of these floors would be covered always
by counters, boxes, or barrels, and to a great extent by
sawdust to absorb dampness.
Inasmuch as 45 per cent of the cost of this project
was to be financed by a P. W. A. grant, the Federal
authorities had been made acquainted with a general
idea of the intentions of the City authorities, and had
given the project tentative approval.
The Finance Commission discovered, however, that
the Superintendent of Public Buildings, under whose
direction the work would be done and who has the
responsibility to determine what renovation is neces-
sary, had not been given an opportunity to study and
pass upon the plans until the Finance Commission
brought them before him.
The Finance Commission desires to compliment the
Superintendent of Public Buildings for his cooperation
in blocking this contemplated squandering of public
money. The City Council, at the request of the Com-
mission, deferred action until the plans had been care-
fully revised under the direction of the Superintendent
of Public Buildings. . In the revision of the plans the
soundness and safety of the building became the aim
rather than a ridiculous ornamentation of it.
7. Regulation of the Financial Practices of the
City of Boston.
The gradual but persistent whittling away of the
sound financial reputation which the City of Boston
had built up in the two decades following the reforms
in management forced by the charter amendments of
1909 impressed upon the Legislature of 1935 the neces-
sity for a study to determine the cause and to recommend
the cure.
A legislative committee invited comment and opinion
from agencies or individuals having special knowledge.
The Finance Commission made its contribution. This
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contribution, in the form of specific recommendations,
was based on the accumulated experience of the Com-
mission in the twenty-five years of its existence.
The Commission had no new theory to advocate
and no old theory to sustain. It had been its function
for twenty-five years to study and observe municipal
administration as no other agencies had authority or
opportunity to do. The Commission has had the
duty by statute to inquire into all features of municipal
operation and expenditure and report upon them, to
point the finger publicly at defects and to recommend
remedial changes.
The long list of reports issued to the Governor and
Legislature, the Mayor and City Council, and the
number of cases referred to prosecuting officers amply
record evidence of the Commission's compliance with
the letter and spirit of the statute which created it.
Opinions given by the Commission and conclusions
drawn are based on the facts of municipal government
as they exist, and are not predicated solely on a theory
of government which one group of taxpayers might
subscribe to and another group might oppose.
When the Commission reported to the Legislative
Committee, therefore, that reform in municipal prac-
tices should not begin with the sudden termination of
the forty-year old policy of requiring Boston's adminis-
trators to show their sovereign, the State of Massa-
chusetts, how much money they needed and why,
before they could tax the people for it, this opinion was
based on a view of the situation from a practical stand-
point. It is perhaps unnecessary here to show why a
theory is unsound that all the cities of Massachusetts,
including Boston, should be treated alike in the matter
of fixing their taxing or spending right. That theory
has been exploded by the Finance Commission on many
occasions.
The Commission took this opportunity in 1935 to
emphasize once more the reasons why Boston should be
limited, and advocated a form of limit that would
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actually accomplish the purpose desired, namely, an
appropriation limit in dollars and cents. The Com-
mission also recommended the establishment by statute
of a department of finance under a city comptroller
who would be independent of the Mayor and City
Council and a check upon City expenditures; and the
application of so much of the Municipal Finance Act to
the City of Boston as relates to the issuance of debt.
It is perhaps timely to point out that had there been
an independent control of City expenditures such as
the Finance Commission visualizes in a department of
finance, it is unlikely that there would have been the
gross waste of City funds that has been related in this
report as having taken place in the award of contracts
and particularly in the payments for snow-removal
work in the last year.
Centralizing administrative authority in the Mayor
is not handicapped by creation of an independent
authority to keep administration within the law.
8. Snow-Removal Equipment.
When the first heavy fall of snow in the winter of
1934-35 covered the Boston streets toward the latter
part of January, 1935, ordinary business was some-
what paralyzed for days because the street cleaning
system of the City and the men entrusted to operate
it proved utterly incapable.
The City's equipment of trucks, in number of units,
was negligible and badly in need of repair or replace-
ment. Though experience had taught that heavy
falls of snow are likely to come upon the City suddenly
and swiftly, and that one or more is bound to come
every year, no thought had been given to preparation
for such eventualities. No modern equipment for snow
loading and removal was owned by the City. The
number of plows on hand was inadequate for anything
more than a gesture at clearing the streets. There
was no definite plan of action for removing snow when
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the emergency would come; and organization within
the City forces such as would seem to be necessary was
entirely lacking.
When the fall of snow had stopped and two days
had passed without noticeable clearing of the streets,
even in the downtown business district, the Mayor
abruptly asked the City Council to appropriate $800,000
for new snow-removal equipment. How this figure
of $800,000 was arrived at, and what units of equip-
ment it was intended for, have not yet been revealed.
The Finance Commission asked for defeat of the
order or delay. The Commission emphasized the
necessity for a survey by an expert committee to deter-
mine the need in number and kind of units, and the
cost; and also, of equal importance, to make certain
of an efficient method of procedure in snow-removal
work and an efficient organization of employees to make
use of the equipment when purchased.
The City Council rejected the Mayor's order for an
$800,000 appropriation. The Mayor disputed the neces-
sity for such a survey as the Commission had recom-
mended. Many months went by without any further
action to prepare the City for the snow of another
year. Late in August, after the Finance Commission
conferred with the Public Works Commissioner and
impressed upon him the necessity of early action on
the preparations for snoAv-removal work, the Mayor
appointed a survey committee such as the Finance
Commission had suggested eight months earlier.
The expert committee reported that only $675,000
was needed to equip the City sufficiently with snow-
removal equipment. They had adjourned sine diCy
without arranging for a new method and a new organiza-
tion. The Finance Commission's protest at this pre-
mature adjournment was immediately followed by a
reconvening of the committee and a plan of action
was produced.
Again, the Finance Commission protested that the
committee's work was not finished without passing
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upon the price to be paid per unit and the types of
equipment to be purchased. This brought word from
the Mayor that that was also part of their job. The
committee, however, — it subsequently turned out, —
was never given an opportunity to participate in this
important detail.
After bids were received, the Public Works Commis-
sioner assembled a group of his own subordinates and
delegated to them the job of passing upon the bids and
making selections for purchase. Experts were hired by
the group. They reported upon the bidders who had
complied with the specifications and those who had not.
They picked out the equipment that they believed it
would be best for the City to buy.
When the group was informed by the Mayor that he
wanted them to reconsider certain of the suggestions of
their first report, they made a new report. Still some
weeks passed without action to close the matter by the
Superintendent of Supplies whose duty it was to make
the contract.
Suddenly, on January 2, 1936, without further
conference with any of the expert committee organized
by him originally to help solve the problem of the
amount and the kind of equipment to buy, the Mayor
conferred with a local trucking contractor, a former law
client of his, and at this conference, lasting less than an
hour, it was decided what equipment would be bought.
The major portion of the purchase was directed to be
made from a manufacturer who was not the lowest
bidder and who had not been recommended by the
Public Works Commissioner's committee or its experts.
These latter had, in fact, reported that this particular
manufacturer offered a truck that did not meet the
specifications. The decision by the Mayor required
the City to pay approximately $165,000 more for its
equipment of trucks and snow-removal equipment than
would have been necessary had advantage been taken
of the expert advice and the best offers made to the
City.
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The Finance Commission has held public hearings to
bring out the facts in connection with this needless
extravagance. These hearings are a part of the work
of 1936, which is later than the period covered by this
report.
The Commission is satisfied that with the help given
by some members of the City Council the Commission
forced a survey by experts of the need for snow-removal
equipment which saved the taxpayers $125,000. The
Commission believes that had the same committee of
experts been permitted to determine the selection of
equipment to be purchased from the bids submitted, a
further saving of $165,000 would have been added.
The list of reports issued by the Commission in the
year 1935 follows:
Feb. 1, 1935. To the Mayor. Regarding the circumstances sur-
rounding the determination by the Trustees of the
George Robert White Fund in 1933 to construct a
Prado or Park in the North End.
Feb. 18, 1935. To the City Council. Opposing the adoption of an
order to authorize a bond issue of $800,000 for the
purchase of snow-removal equipment.
Feb. 20, 1935. To the Mayor. Regarding purchase of bonds by
Edmund L. Dolan, former City Treasurer, in the
years 1930 to 1933, inclusive.
Feb. 25, 1935. To the Mayor. Regarding his request for a copy of
testimony taken before the Finance Commission.
March 25, 1935. To the City Council. Recommending that immediate
action be taken regarding approval of the gas lighting
contracts.
April 6, 1935. To the Committee on Municipal Finance. Regarding
fixing a Hmit on the property tax in the City of
Boston.
April 10, 1935. To the Mayor. Reporting further on the Land-Takings
for the Layout and Construction of the East Boston
Vehicular Tunnel.
April 26, 1935. To the Mayor. Opposing the City Council's request
to abandon the system of Federal inspection of
foods purchased for City institutions and recom-
mending that this type of inspection be extended.
May 13, 1935. To the City Council. Replying to an order adopted
by that Body requesting the Finance Commission
"to look into the so-called 'Patch Paving' con-
tracts in the City of Boston."
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June 1, 1935. To the Mayor. Requesting an explanation of his
I proposal to employ twenty-eight additional constables
.
June 11, 1935. To the Mayor. Giving reasons why the form of
contract made by the City with the dealers for
the City's fuel oil and gasoline supply should
be revised.
June 28, 1935. To the Mayor. Regarding the administration of the
Boston City Hospital.
July 6, 1935. To the Mayor. Regarding the failure of the system
for the collection of tolls at the East Boston Vehicular
Tunnel.
July 20, 1935. To the Mayor. Regarding the contract for the repair
of the ferryboat ''Charles C. Donoghue"; also
opposing certain practices in the requirements for
ship repair work.
July 23, 1935. To the Mayor. Opposing the adoption of the recom-
mendation of the Public Works Commissioner to
award a contract for the reconstruction of the South
Ferry to W. H. Ellis & Son Company.
July 27, 1935. To the Mayor. Protesting the practice of awarding
City contracts without fair competitive bidding;
also calling attention to contracts for Quincy Market
Building Repairs and the Roofing Contract at Deer
Island.
Aug. 2, 1935. To the Mayor. Regarding the specifications of a
contract to furnish kitchen equipment at the Long
Island Hospital.
Aug. 5, 1935. To the Mayor. Regarding his contract policy.
Sept. 6, 1935. To the Civil Service Commissioner. Enclosing copy
of report in regard to employment of twenty-eight
additional constables.
Sept. 10, 1935. To the Mayor. Relating to awards of contracts to
other than the lowest bidder.
Sept. 14, 1935. To the Mayor. Relating to recommendations of the
National Board of Fire Underwriters for economies
in the Fire Department.
Sept. 16, 1935. To the City Council. Relating to waste, extravagance
and graft in connection with the proposed new court
house.
Sept. 20, 1935. To the Mayor. Calling attention to irregularities in
assignment of work at the entrances to the East
Boston Traffic Tunnel to B. F. Hanrahan, an East
Boston contractor; also the Mayor's reply.
Sept. 21, 1935. To the Mayor. Urging speedy action on the making
of proper plans for snow removal and the purchase
of new equipment.
Oct. 3, 1935. To the Mayor. Giving reasons why the Commission
should not accede to a request from the Corporation
Counsel for copies of testimony taken by the Finance
Commission.
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Oct. 11, 1935. To the Mayor. Answering his letter in relation to
the Commission's refusal to give to the Corporation
Counsel copies of certain testimony.
Oct. 21, 1935. To the City Council. Relating to the order for an
appropriation for snow-removal equipment.
Oct. 25, 1935. To the Mayor. Recommending further study by the
snow survey committee to determine makes of trucks
and plows to be purchased.
Oct. 25, 1935. To the Mayor. Relating to the work of the snow survey
committee.
Oct. 28, 1935. To the City Council. Recommending that action on
the loan order for $460,000 for the renovation of
the Quincy Market Building be deferred.
Oct. 30, 1935. To the Mayor. Regarding the conditions under which
the Commission allowed the Corporation Counsel
to examine the Finance Commission files relating
to an investigation of E. L. Dolan, former City
Treasurer.
Oct. 31, 1935. To the Mayor. Dissenting report in relation to the
above matter.
Nov. 5, 1935. To the City Council. Withdrawing objection to the
adoption of a loan for the Renovation of Quincy
Market.
Nov. 9, 1935. To the Mayor. Relating to the proposed purchase,
without public competition, of four pieces of fire
apparatus.
Nov. 20, 1935. To the Special Commission on Municipal Finance.
Regarding the proposed regulation of Financial Prac-
tices in Boston.
Dec. 5, 1935. To the Mayor. Renewing the Finance Commission's
protest against the purchase of four pieces of fire
apparatus without public competition.
Dec. 16, 1935. To the Ma^^or. Regarding the proposed award of a
contract for snow removal to Hugh Nawn, Inc.
Dec. 31, 1935. To the Governor. Regarding the purchase by the
City of Boston of second-hand equipment for the
Long Island Hospital.
Respectfully submitted,
E. Mark Sullivan, Chairman,
Philip A. Chapman,
Robert Robinson,
James E. Maguire,
Joseph A. Scolponeti,
The Finance Commission,
Robert E. Cunniff,
Secretary,
